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Minority games where groups of agents remember, react or incorporate information with different
timescales are investigated. We support our findings by analytical arguments whenever possible.
PACS numbers: 88
INTRODUCTION
Heterogeneity is gradually being recognized as one of the most important ingredients for the modeling of financial
markets. Among the many types of heterogeneities, timescales are difficult to understand analytically, because they
increase usually much the complexity of the equations to solve. However, as argued very early [1], financial market
participants have very discernably different timescales, which deserve therefore a detailled study. Among recent works
on the topic, two models of stochastic volatility have explicitely included an infinite number of timescales [2, 3].
Here we investigate several types of timescale heterogeneities in the Minority Game model (MG) framework: strategy
change frequency, strategy-strategy correlation, reaction rates and score memory. We are able to provide analytical
support for our finding in the last three cases. Previous work addressed the effects of trading frequency [4, 5]
analytically.
CANONICAL MG
The minority game is easily defined: at each time step, all the players have to choose between two alternatives;
those who happen to be in the minority win. This is variant of Arthur’s El Farol bar [6] problem where the resource
level is set to satisfy half of the people. The Minority Game is exactly solvable which makes it an ideal model to
study and understand various aspects of the dynamics of competition.
Mathematically, agent i = 1, · · · , N takes action ai(t) ∈ {−1,+1} at each time step and receives a payoff −ai(t)A(t)
where A(t) is the aggregated outcome A(t) =
∑N
i=1 ai(t). The agents base their decisions on public information which
is encoded in an integer number µ(t) drawn uniformly from 1, · · · , P . In order to process this information they are
endowed with S strategies, which are fixed maps, or look-up tables, from the current public information µ(t) to an
action. At time t, agent i decides to trust his best strategy si(t) = argmaxs=1,···,S yi,s(t), where yi,s(t) is the score of
strategy s of agent i, which evolves according to
yi,s(t+ 1) = yi,s(t)− aµ(t)i,s A(t) (1)
Strategy change frequency
The above definition of the MG assumes implicitely that all the agents may change the strategy that they use
(si(t)) at each time step. Variants of the game where all the agents update synchronously their si(t) every T time
steps have been studied in the literature [7, 8, 9, 10], and are exactly solvable in the limit T → ∞, in which case
they are called batch games. This part of the paper separates the populations into two groups. Fast agents behave as
usual, whereas slow agents update their strategies synchronously every T time steps. This introduces a heterogeneity
of time scales. I n essence, it is similar to giving a longer history memory in games where the state µ(t) is the binary
encoding of the last M winning choice, also known as games with real histories. Giving a larger M to a set of agents
is already found in the very first paper on the MG, and was analyzed further in [11, 12]. Such agents do surprisingly
worse than their colleagues as long as the system is not deep into the symmetric phase, which is characterized by
alternating winning sides; Metzler [13] showed that agents with a larger M need a large alternating probability in
order to be able to profit from it. The case we study here is much simpler as it does not require real histories and is a
priori more suitable to mathematical understanding. Unfortunately, since the exact analytical solution does not exist
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FIG. 1: Variance σ2/N (top) and predictability H/N (bottom) as a function of α for φ=0.7 and several values of T . Simulations
with P = 64, averages over 200 samples
for games where all the agents update synchronously their strategies every T time steps, we cannot solve the mixed
case either and must resort to numerical simulations.
The relative composition of the population is tuned by a parameter φ: if N is the total number of agents, φN of
them are ordinary Minority Game agents, i.e., fast, whereas (1−φ)N update their strategy choice variable si(t) every
T time steps, that is, their scores evolve following
ysi (t+ 1) = y
s
i (t)−
t∑
t′=t−T+1
a
µ(t′)
i,s A(t
′) if t MOD T = 0
ysi (t+ 1) = y
s
i (t) otherwise. (2)
As usual, we shall focus on the predictability
H =
1
P
P∑
ν=1
〈A|ν〉2 (3)
where 〈A|ν〉 is the temporal average of A conditional to µ(t) = ν. If H > 0, knowing µ makes it possible to predict
statistically the next outcome. H measures the amount of information left by the agents in the game. The fluctuations
σ2 = 〈A2〉 play a special role as they quantify the quality of resource sharing achieved by the population, which is
usually benchmarked against the fluctuations produced by random choice σ2/N = 1. It is easy to see indeed that the
σ2 is nothing else than the average total loss per time step of the population. Of particular interest in the case of
competing populations are their respective average gains per time step.
Figure 1 reports the behaviour of H and σ2 as a function of α = P/N , for a fixed φ and different values of T . In
the predictable, asymmetric phase (H > 0), the slow agents do not change the unique stationary state; as a result,
H does not depend on T , but σ2 is slightly lowered as T increases, because strategy switching occurs less often. On
the other hand, in the unpredictable, symmetric phase (H = 0), multiple stationary states exist as a result of broken
ergodicity [7, 14], and any modification to the system will accordingly change the final values of σ. This is the case
here: the introduction of a small amount of slow agents reduces the total amount of fluctuations because they damp
the overreaction of the fast players without contributing too much to the global outcome A.
What is more surprising is the behaviour of σ2 in the symmetric phase when one varies φ, as shown in Fig. 2:
at fixed α = 0.2, slow agents (φ = 0) produce larger fluctuations than fast ones (φ = 1); increasing the fraction of
fast agents φ decreases the fluctuations which reaches a minimum below 1, the random choice benchmark, and then
increase again to reach the standard MG value, slightly above 1. This means that the two groups live in symbiosis,
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FIG. 2: Volatility σ2/N as a function of φ for α = 0.2 fixed (P = 32, N = 160).
and that there is a non-trivial optimal composition of the population. Other known examples of symbiosis in MGs
include speculators and producers [11].
In such cases, it is natural to characterize the information ecology of the model (see [11, 15]), that is, who exploits
who. To this end, Fig. (3) reports the average gain per time step of fast agents γf , which decreases monotonically as
their concentration φ increases, but stays roughly constant as long as φ < 0.4. In this region, the slow agents provide
information that the fast agents exploit. The losses of the latter are greatly reduced compared to φ = 1, but they
seem not to be able to achieve positive gain on average. Similarly, when the slow agents are few (φ > 0.8), they profit
from overreacting fast agents.
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FIG. 3: Average gain of fast (left) and slow (right) agents as a function of φ for several T . Simulations with N = 300, P = 64,
averages over 200 samples
Strategy correlation
In the standard MG, all the aµi,s are random variables, drawn completely independently from each other. Take an
agent with two strategies; they will stipulate the same action a fraction c = 1/2 of the µs on average. In other words,
the standard-MG agents behave in the same way irrespectively on their strategy choice for half of the market states
4µ.[25] MG with tunable c where introduced in Ref. [11] and also studied later in Refs [8, 16]. The parameter c induces
a reaction time scale ∼ 1/(1− c): the smaller c, the more adaptive an agent is; on the other end, people with c = 1
are not adaptive: they inject predictability and are ideal candidates for exploitation. The latter were introduced as
producers, that is, people who do not care much about timing in market, but use the market as a tool for exchanging
goods [15]; producers (c = 1) and speculators (c < 1) live in symbiosis [11], that is, the gain of a given group increases
then the other group is also present.
Here, we consider the case where the two groups s and f have 0 ≤ cg < 1, g = s, f . The apparent similarity of this
setup with the case previously studied [11] is deceptive, as we shall see. The strategies are drawn according to
Pf (a
µ
i,1 = a
µ
i,2) = cf ; (4)
Ps(a
µ
i,1 = a
µ
i,2) = cs. (5)
(6)
When cf < cs, group f is the fast one, and group s is the slow one. The asymmetric phase of the model for an
arbitrary number of groups is exactly solvable in the limit N →∞ with replica trick [11, 14, 17]. The solution gives
H
N
=
φcf + (1− φ)cs + φ(1− cf )Qf + (1− φ)(1 − cs)Qs
(1 + φχf + (1− φ)χs)2 (7)
where Qg =
∑
i∈Ng 〈si(t)〉2 (g = f, s); χf and χs are the integrated response functions [7]. These four quantities all
depend on two variables ζf and and ζs which are the solutions of two coupled non-linear equations (see appendix).
Eq. (7) shows that in this case the stationary state of the asymmetric phase depends on the composition of the
population, which is also true of the location of the critical point.
The respective gains of the two groups can also be computed exactly. Starting from the total losses
σ2
N
=
H
N
+ φ(1 − cf)(1 −Qf ) + (1 − φ)(1 − cs)(1 −Qs) (8)
and observing that if σ2λ =
∑P
µ=1〈(Afast + λAslow)2|µ〉/P , the gains of the agents are nothing else than
γs = −〈AslowA〉 = −1
2
∂σ2λ
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
(9)
γf = −σ2 − γs. (10)
From the replica calculus, we find
γs
Ns
=
H
N
χs − cs + (1− cs)Qs
1 + φχf + (1− φ)χs − (1− cs)(1 −Qs); (11)
γf
Nf
= − 1
φ
σ2
N
− 1− φ
φ
γs
Ns
. (12)
The behaviour of the game is non trivial, which is already clear in Fig 4, where the fluctuations, or average losses
of the players per time-step, are plotted agains cs, showing a maximum. In this kind of plot, one should be careful
to stay in the asymmetric phase, because the critical point αc depends on cs, cf , and φ. Taking α > 1 solves this
problem since αc ≤ 1. The minimum of σ2/N is surprising at first. Figure 5 gives a deeper understanding of this
peculiar phenomenon by plotting the gains of the two groups. The minimum of the losses can be attributed entirely
the slow agents only, who profit quite remarkably from the fast agents (cf = 0) unless they are very slow. This shows
an competition between two effects: being slower means that one overreact less, in particular with respect to local
fluctuations; inversely, being too slow makes it too difficult to react to being exploited. Interestingly, increasing cs
increases monotonically the gains of group f .
The relative fraction of each type of agent is a crucial parameter, as illustrated by Fig 5, in particular when one
group of agents has a large strategy correlation. In order to shed more light on the matter, we produced plots of the
regions where one group has an advantage over the other. When φ = 0.5, Figure 6 contains four regions of interest.
When cg < c
∗ ≃ 0.61, group g on average wins more than the other group g′ as long as cg > c′g, which means that
as long as both groups have sufficiently low cs, the slower the better. On the other hand, when cg > c
(m) ≃ 0.98,
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FIG. 4: Fluctuations σ2/N versus the strategy correlation parameter cs of the slow agents (φ = 0.5, cf = 0). Simulations with
P = 64, α = 2, averages over 200 samples.
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FIG. 5: The average gains gf/Nf , gs/Ns for fast and slow agents respectively (φ = 0.5, cf = 0). Lines are theoretical predictions
from Eq (10). Simulations with N = 32, P = 64, averages over 200 samples
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FIG. 6: Regions of relative advantage for φ = φf = 0.5 (left graph) and φ = 0.01 (right graph); the region filled corresponds to
the symmetric phase, in which the replica calculus is not valid.
6group g′ always exploits group g. For intermediate values of cg, the outcome depends on the precise value of both cg
and c′g. While changing φ leaves unaffected the diagonal boundary, it has two remarkable effects: first it changes the
non-linear boundary between the γf < γs and γs < γs regions by roughly rotating it clockwise. A new region also
appears for α and φ small enough where the gain of group in relative sparseness is positive; it is however very small,
and only appears when the largest group has a very large c. In this case, one needs to be few and react fast in order
to be able to exploit very slow agents so much that one’s gain is positive.
GAMES WITH NO PUBLIC INFORMATION
The case where P = 1, that is, when there is no public information available corresponds to the limit α = 0 of the
previous section, and is particularly simple to understand analytically [18, 19]; as a result explicit formulae for the
fluctuations and gains can be obtained. Given A(t), each agent i receives a payoff −ai(t)A(t), which is stored in the
score
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− A(t)
N
(13)
and
P [ai(t+ 1) = 1] =
1 + tanh(Γi∆i(t))
2
. (14)
Γi is a reaction rate: it specifies the difference of behaviour to a change of ∆i. Because of Eq (13) it is also timescale.
Linking the above model with financial markets is straighforward if one assumes that the log-price evolves according
to
p(t+ 1) = p(t) +
A
N
. (15)
This allows us to propose a new interpretation of this case: rewriting ∆i(t) = −
∑t
t′=0A(t)/N +∆i(0) where ∆i(0)
is the initial condition of agent i, one sees immediately that
∆i(t) = −p(t) + ∆i(0). (16)
∆i(0) is nothing else than the asset reference price, or value, of agent i. Hence, this equation describes a model of N
investors having each a value in mind for the price, and acting accordingly.[26] The agents are therefore fundamentalists
[19] who compare the current price with a reference price φi, and Γi tunes the price excursion from its supposed
fundamental value ∆i(0) tolerated by agent i.
If ∆i(0) = 0, all the ∆is are the same and can be replaced by ∆. Eq (13) becomes
∆(t+ 1) = ∆(t)− tanh(Γ∆(t)) + n(t) (17)
where n(t) is a noise term with zero average 〈n(t)〉 = 0 and 〈n(t)n(t′)〉 = δt,t′ [1 − tanh(Γ∆(t))2]/N ; it vanishes
therefore in the N →∞ limit. It is easy to find that the fixed point ∆(0) = 0 is stable if Γ < Γ∗ = 2 and 〈A2〉 ∝ N ,
and unstable otherwise; in the latter case, a period 2 dynamics emerges, with the stable points determined by [18]
∆(1) = tanh(Γ∆(1))/2. (18)
and 〈A2〉 ∝ N2. A Taylor expansion of Eq (18) gives ∆1 ≃ ±
√
3(Γ−2)
Γ3 for Γ close to 2; on the other hand,
A
2 −∆1 ∝
exp(−Γ) for large Γ. A way to check numerically the value of Γ∗ is to observe the onset of the change of 〈∆2〉 from
O(N−1) to O(1) as a function of Γ. Heterogeneous initial conditions ∆i(0) 6= 0 help to stabilize the fixed point by
raising Γ∗ [19].
We shall be particularly interested in the gains of the agents. The knowledge of P (∆) allows us to compute the
average gain 〈γ〉 = −〈A2〉/N , i.e. the fluctuations themselves
〈A2〉
N
=
1
N
∫
d∆P (∆)〈A2|∆〉 = 1
N
∫
d∆P (∆)[〈(δA)2|∆〉+ 〈A|∆〉2] (19)
= 1 + (N − 1)
∫
d∆P (∆) tanh(Γ∆)2 (20)
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FIG. 7: Fluctuations versus Γ from numerical simulations (thick line; N = 100, 106 iterations per point), from the Fokker-Plank
equation (thin line, Γ < 2), the Gaussian approximation (dashed red line), and Eq (25) (dash-dotted line, Γ > 2)
If Γ > Γ∗ and N →∞, we can simply write
〈A2〉
N2
→ 4∆21 (21)
which is about 12(Γ−2)Γ3 for Γ close to 2. For Γ < 2, one must first keep N finite and derive P (∆). The dynamical
equation for ∆ can be rewritten as a Fokker-Planck equation, which reads
∂P (∆)
∂t
=
∂2
2∂∆2
[
1− (N − 1) tanh(Γ∆)2
N
P (∆)
]
+
∂
∂∆
[tanh(Γ∆)P (∆)] (22)
Solving this equation in the stationary states gives
P (∆) =
1
Z
[2 +N(cosh(2Γ∆)− 1))]
−(1+Γ)
Γ cosh(Γ∆)2 (23)
where Z is the normalisation factor. When Γ is small, P can be approximated by a Gaussian with zero average and
〈∆2〉 = 1/[2Γ[(N(Γ + 1)− Γ]. Therefore
〈A2〉
N
≃ 1 + (N − 1) Γ
2[N(Γ + 1)− Γ] → 1 +
Γ
2(Γ + 1)
≃ 1 + Γ
2
N →∞, Γ≪ 1 (24)
Figure 7 shows that the Fokker-Planck equation provides a good description of the stationary state for Γ ≤ 1, whereas
for larger Γ the hypothesis of small jumps in ∆ is clearly wrong; this is due to the fact that with Γ > 1, the drift
term makes ∆ change sign on average at each time step. The Gaussian approximation bends in the wrong way as Γ
increases and should not be used for Γ > 0.01. For Γ > 2, P (∆) separates into two symmetric peaks, centered roughly
at ±∆1; it can therefore be approximated by
P (∆) ≃ 1
2Z
[2 +N(cosh(2Γ(∆−∆1)− 1))]
−(1+Γ)
Γ cosh(Γ(∆−∆1))2
+
1
2Z
[2 +N(cosh(2Γ(∆ +∆1))− 1))]
−(1+Γ)
Γ cosh(Γ(∆ +∆1))
2 (25)
Heterogeneous learning rates
Let us consider G groups of respectively φgN agents, g = 1, · · · , G; all the agents belonging to group g have Γg.
Using the notation f(xg) =
∑
g φgf(xg) for any function f of variables xg, the dynamical equation for ∆ reads now
∆(t+ 1) = ∆(t)− tanh[Γg∆(t)] + η(t) (26)
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FIG. 8: Average gain versus Γf from numerical simulations (circles: fast agents with Γf , slow agents with Γs = 0.001) and Eq
(31) (dashed lines); average over 100000 time steps, after 10/Γs time steps, average over 20 samples.
where ηg(t) are Gaussian noises with zero average and variance 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = δt,t′ (1−tanh(Γg∆)
2
N . Linear stability shows
that ∆(0) is a stable fixed point as long as
Γg < 2. (27)
When this point is unstable, it replaced by a period-two dynamics with stable point
∆(1) =
tanh(Γg∆(1))
2
(28)
Going through the same procedure as before, one finds that P (∆) is determined by
dP
P
=
−2Ntanh(Γg∆)[1 + Γg(1− tanh(Γg∆)2]− 2Γg tanh(Γg∆)[1 − tanh(Γg∆)2]
Ntanh(Γg∆)
2
+ 1− tanh(Γg∆)2
(29)
This cannot be integrated any more. The Gaussian approximation consists in keeping only the terms linear in ∆ in
this equation, and results in ∆ being of average 0 and variance 〈∆2〉 = 1
2[NΓg(1+Γg)−Γ2g ]
for small Γ.
The average gain per player of group g at fixed ∆ is equal to
〈γg|∆〉
Ng
= −〈A
2
g|∆〉+
∑
g′ 6=g 〈AgA′g|∆〉
Ng
= −1− (Ng − 1) tanh(Γg∆)2 − tanh(Γg∆)
∑
g′
N ′g tanh(Γ
′
g∆) (30)
Assuming that the Gaussian approximation is valid, i.e. if all the Γg are small,
〈γg〉
Ng
≃ −1− Γg〈∆2〉
[−Γg +NΓg]→ −1− Γg
2[1 + Γg]
(31)
for infinite N . The gain of an agent of group g can be compared to the average gain, which yieds
〈γg〉 − 〈γg〉 → Γg − Γg
2(1 + Γg)
. (32)
In other words, the smaller Γg, the smaller the losses of that group. This is intuitive: at a given time, i.e. at a given
∆, the fraction of players whose action is opposite to the sign of ∆ is larger for smaller Γ.
Figure 8 compares 〈γ〉 from numerical simulations and from Eq (31). As before, the approximations made are valid
for small Γ. This figure also indicates that the transition at Γ∗ is smooth.
90 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
σ
2 /N
-1
FIG. 9: Fluctuations σ2/N − 1 versus λ for Γ = 0.1, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9 (bottom to top) obtained by numerical simulations.
N = 100, 106 iterations per point;
Heterogenous score memory λ
Another way of having heterogeneous time scales is to differ in one’s score memory. Before studying groups, let us
again characterise first the homogeneous case. For the sake of simplicity, we consider exponential moving averages.
There are two ways of implementing them:
∆(t+ 1) = ∆(t)(1 − λ)− A(t)
N
(33)
and
∆′(t+ 1) = ∆′(t)(1 − λ)− λA
′(t)
N
(34)
The length of score memory is 1/| ln(1 − λ)| ∝ 1/λ for small λ. One can transform Eq (33) into (34) by setting
∆′ = ∆λ and Γ′ = Γ/λ. The same stability analysis as above gives for a homogeneous population
Γ + λ < 2 (35)
and
λ(Γ′ + 1) < 2 (36)
Increasing λ at fixed Γ and Γ′ has therefore opposite effects for the two kinds of dynamics: a small λ stabilises Eq
(33) and destabilises Eq (34). Since there is a one-to-one correspondance between all the results of Eqs (33) and (34),
we shall focus on Eq (33). The period-two fixed point for Γ + λ > 2 is now determined by ∆(1) = 12−λ tanh(Γ∆
(1)).
Assuming that ∆(0) = 0 is stable, the same procedure as before yields
dP
P
= −2N [λ∆+ tanh(Γ∆)](1 + λ+ Γ[1− tanh(Γ∆)]) + Γ tanh(Γ∆)[1 − tanh(Γ∆)
2]
N(λ∆+ tanh(Γ∆))2 + 1− tanh(Γ∆)2 (37)
In the Gaussian approximation, one finds
〈∆2〉 = 1
2[(Γ + λ)(1 + λ+ Γ)N − Γ2] . (38)
As consequence, for small Γ, λ > 0 decreases the fluctuations. The Fokker-Planck equation holds if λ + Γ < 1;
otherwise, the change of sign of ∆ at each time step (neglecting the noise) causes more fluctuations. Therefore, σ2/N
has a minimum at λ+Γ = 1 when λ increases, as illustrated by Fig 9. The Gaussian approximation is very good for
small Γ and λ.
10
Generalising these results to groups of agents is more complicated than for heterogeneous Γ because of the role of
λ in Eq. (33): each group g with a given λg has its own ∆g
∆g(t+ 1) = ∆g(t)(1 − λg)− tanh(Γ∆g′) + η(t) = fg({∆g′}) + η(t) (39)
where 〈η(t)η(t′)〉 = δt,t′(1− tanh(Γ∆g′ )2)/N . For infinite N , the linear stability conditions of the fixed point ∆g = 0
for all g are
∑
g′ |∂fg/∂∆g′ | < 1, that is,
|1− λg − φgΓg|+
∑
g′ 6=g
φg′ tanh(Γg′∆g′ ) < 1 (40)
for all g. When λg + φgΓg < 1, i.e. both λg and Γ are small, the stability condition is Γg′ < λg + 2φgΓg; for instance
if Γg = Γ for all g, and φg = 1/G, then the condition is Γ(1− 2/G) < λg. The other case is obtained when Γg ∼ 1/φg
and gives λg + Γg′ < 2, which is the same as before. Interestingly, some unstable ∆
(0)
g can coexist with stable ones,
for instance when Γg = Γ = 2 − ǫ, 0 < ǫ ≪ 1, φ = 1/G and λg = 2ǫg/G, where the dynamics of ∆g is stable for
g < G/2 and unstable otherwise. This is clearly a source of losses for fast-forgetting players. Going back to the
average gain per player per time step, ones indeed that the gain of group g is intimately related to the variance of
∆g. The multivariate Fokker-Planck equation reads
∂P (∆, t)
∂t
=
∑
g
∂
∂∆g

([λg∆g + tanh(Γ∆g′)]P)+ 1
2
∑
g,g′
∂
∂∆g′
(Dg,g′P )

 (41)
with
Dg,g′ =
1− tanh(Γg′′∆g′′ )2
N
+ (λg∆g + tanh(Γg′′∆g′′))(λg′∆g′ + tanh(Γg′′∆g′′ )) (42)
Solving a linearised version of Eq (41) is done following standard procedure [20] and gives a multivariate Gaussian
solution. For G = 2, we have the resulting equations.
P (∆f ,∆s) =
1
2πσfσs
√
1− ρ2 exp
[
− 1
2(1− ρ2)
(
∆2f
σ2f
− 2ρ∆f∆s
σfσs
+
∆2s
σ2s
)]
(43)
The expressions for σf , σs and ρ are too long to be reported here [27]. Reusing Eq (30) the respective average gain is
〈γf 〉 ≃ −1− Γ2
(〈∆2f 〉(Nf − 1) +Ns〈∆f∆s〉)
= −1− Γ2fσ2f (Nf − 1)− ΓfΓsNsρσfσs] (44)
Figure 10 plots the gains of the two groups and clearly shows that all other things beeing equal, having a shorter
memory is an advantage. Indeed, when Γf = Γs = Γ and φf = φs = 1/2, as in Fig. (10), Eq (44) leads to
〈γf 〉 − 〈γs〉 ≃
8Γ2(λf − λs)(1 + Γ + λf + λs)[λf (1 + λf + Γ2 ) + λs(1 + λs + Γ2 ) + λfλs]
[2λfλs + Γ(λf + λs)][4Γ2 + 2(2 + 2λf + λs)(2 + λf + 2λs) + 3Γ(4 + 3λf + 3λs)]
× 1
2Γ2 + Γ(2 + 3λf + 3λs) + 2(λf + λ2f + λs + λ
2
s + λfλs)
(45)
which is of course positive when λf > λs. The above sections suggest that such advantage is menaced by increasing
Γf . Interestingly, increasing φf increases the gains of both groups, as the fast agents suffer less from the fluctuations
caused by their slow colleagues. In the unstable region, the effect is the opposite, that is, fast forgetting agents fail
to smooth out sufficiently slowly large fluctuations, and suffer from larger losses than slower agents. We performed
similar numerical simulations for P > 1 and Γ =∞ (standard MG), and found out similar results: faster agents end
up earning less in both phases (we could not find an opposite result), which can be interpreted by their tendency to
switch more often between their strategies.
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FIG. 10: Average gain per time step versus λf for fast players (circles) and slow players (squares). Continuous lines are from
the Gaussian approximation of Eq (44). Γf = Γs = 0.001, 10
7 iterations per point.
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS
The four types of timescale heterogeneities investigated point to compatible and broad conclusions. First, agents
with a smaller strategy change frequency are similar to agents with larger strategy-strategy correlation, except that
their presence does not change the onset of the critical point, nor H . Accordingly, the gain of fast/slow agents in both
cases show similar behaviour. Although Ref. [4] did not compute the average gain as a function of playing frequency
it did show however that agents that trade less often tend to stick more to one strategy in the asymmetric phase;
since frozen agents have a higher average payoff, this suggests agent who play less often win more. We confirme this
intuition by extensive numerical simulations, and checked that this conclusion does not depend on the concentration
of slower agents. However, the results is the opposite in the symmetric phase where slower agents are exploited, while
all the agents have an equal gain at the critical point. Overreacting, that is, having a larger reaction rate than the
average population is detrimental. Reference [5] did not study the gain of agents with heterogeneous reaction rates,
therefore we refrain to generalize this conclusion to P > 1. Finally, for P = 1, agents with a smaller finite score
memory do generally better than average, unless they have a too large reaction rate.
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REPLICA CALCULUS
The calculus parallels mostly the established procedure [11, 14]: the dynamics minimizes H [18] that is akin to
an energy. The stationary state of the system corresponds therefore to the ground state of H . After some algebraic
manipulations it is possible to find relations that link the quantities that we have introduced The predictability is
given by
Hλ
N
=
φcf + λ
2(1− φ)cs + φ(1 − cf )Qf + λ2(1− φ)(1 − cs)Qs
(1 + φχf + λ2(1− φ)χs)2 (46)
where the integrated response functions χs and χf are defined as
χf =

α− (1− φ) erf
(
ζs√
2
)
erf
(
ζf√
2
) − φ


−1
,
χs
χf
=
erf
(
ζs√
2
)
erf
(
ζf√
2
) ; (47)
The self-overlap Qg is equal to
Qg = 1−
√
2
π
e−ζ
2
g/2
ζg
−
(
1− 1
ζ2g
)
erf
(
ζg√
2
)
(48)
All these quantities depend on ζs and ζf , determined through
ζ f =
√
α (1− cf )
φcf + (1− φ) cs + φ (1− cf)Qf + (1− φ) (1− cs)Qs ,
ζf
ζs
=
√
1− cf
1− cs ; (49)
φ (1− cf )
(√
2
π
e−ζ
2
f/2
ζf
+
(
1− 1
ζ2f
)
erf
(
ζf√
2
))
+
α (1− cf )
ζ2f
+
+ (1− φ) (1− cs)
(√
2
π
e−ζ
2
s/2
ζs
+
(
1− 1
ζ2s
)
erf
(
ζs√
2
))
= 1. (50)
Finally, the average gain of slow agents is
γs
Ns
= − 1
1− φ
1
2
∂
∂λ
σ2λ
N
|λ=1 = − 1
1− φ limβ→∞
∂Hλ(β)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
− (1 − cs)(1 −Qs) (51)
that leads to the expressions (11).
More than two groups
The results above are readily generalised to G groups denoted by g = 1, . . . , G: group g comprises Ng = φgN agents
equipped with two strategies with correlation cg:
H
N
=
〈c+ (1− c)Q〉
(1 + 〈χ〉)2 (52)
σ2
N
=
H
N
+
〈(1 − c)(1−Q)〉
N
(53)
γg
Ng
=
H
N
χg − cg + (1− cg)Qg
1 + 〈χ〉 − (1− cg) (1−Qg) (54)
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where the average 〈.〉 is over the groups.
Qg = 1−
√
2
π
e−ζ
2
g/2
ζg
−
(
1− 1
ζ2g
)
erf
(
ζg√
2
)
(55)
1 = 〈(1 − c)
(√
2
π
e−ζ
2/2
ζ
+
(
1− 1
ζ2
)
erf
(
ζ√
2
))
〉+ α(1 − cg)
ζ2g
(56)
ζg
ζg′
=
√
1− cg
1− cg′ . (57)
